abstract: This research evaluates the empirical evidence of an emerging transnational corporate community over the past 25 years.
In a recent article, Carroll and Fennema (2002) find little empirical evidence to support the arguments made by McMichael (2000) , Sklair (2001) , Robinson and Harris (2000) and others, concerning the emergence of a transnational business community. Their conclusions are based on the examination of interlocking directorates in a disproportionate stratified sample of 176 corporations between 1976 and 1996. Our results, based on an analysis of the Fortune Global 500 firms between 1983 and 1998, suggest otherwise. We find a significant increase in both the total number of interlocks and an even greater growth in transnational ties. These indicate two boards that are connected by a single board member, while 'thick' ties denote boards that share at least two members.
The empirical studies to date have focused on concomitant interlocks (Mizruchi, 1996) . These works have typically examined the impact of these linkages on organizational performance, in terms of collusion, information flows, profitability, financing and reduction of uncertainty (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998) . More recently, researchers have explored these interlocks in terms of the possible emergence of a global business community (Carroll and Fennema, 2002) or the rise of a new class of global elites (Robinson and Harris, 2000) .
Two additional issues need to be highlighted. First, it is important to recognize that interlocking directorates give us insight into the structure of control of these corporations rather than the ownership of these firms (Useem, 1984) . It is relatively easy to identify those who control these organizations. The names of directors are, by law, public information (although board memberships can be obscured by proxies, such as relatives or close business associates). It is not so simple, however, to identify who owns these firms. Stock ownership is much more easily hidden. Second, we must distinguish between the potential power of these interlocks and the actual power exercised. Interlocks may create the possibility for collusive activities. This does not necessarily imply that these activities do, in fact, occur. This becomes an empirical question. We should also recognize that the absence of these linkages does not negate the possibility of collusive behaviors among other individuals not formally identified as interlocking directors. This further suggests that the associations among board members do not necessarily imply the formation of a separate class of individuals, a so-called 'global elite'. Carroll and Fennema (2002) use interlocking directorates as evidence for the possible emergence of a transnational business community, a group of individuals and organizations who share a common interest, one not bound by geographical location.
Carroll and Fennema's Research
Carroll and Fennema based their current study on a stratified sample of 176 firms originally constructed by Fennema (1982) in his earlier work on transnational interlocking directorates. Fennema used a disproportionate stratified sample design in his previous analyses to avoid having the sample dominated by US based firms (Fennema, 1982: 402) , which comprised the majority of large corporations in 1976. As a result, US firms were underrepresented in the sample while corporations from other regions, especially Europe, were intentionally overrepresented. 1 The sample included 68 companies from Europe (39 percent of total sample) and only 34 firms from the US (19 percent of the total sample). This disproportionate sampling technique was appropriate in Fennema's original work because the earlier study focused primarily on the analysis of integration within the European Communities (Fennema, 1982: 249) , rather than structural properties of the entire global economy.
Carroll and Fennema used the earlier sample as the basis for their longitudinal study of global corporate integration by comparing the interlock structures of these same 176 firms between 1976 and 1996, stressing the analytical merits of having a consistent sample over time. In this case, however, their disproportionate sample design is inappropriate, as this technique is only useful when examining subgroups within a population (Frankfort-Nachmias and Leon-Guerrero, 2002) . Given Carroll and Fennema's (2002) goal of understanding the characteristics of the global economy in its entirety, a more representative sample would be appropriate. Further, maintaining consistency of cases (firms) over time fails to take into account changes in the global corporate hierarchy during this period. Hence, Carroll and Fennema's study tells us something about changes in the integration of these 176 firms, but little about shifts in the global corporate structure of the world economy over this period.
Our Sample
In contrast, our samples are drawn from the Fortune Global 500 in 1983 and 1998, which ranks the world's 500 largest firms by revenues, irrespective of economic sector of activity. 2 There is no necessary continuity of specific companies (or individual directors) over this period. This sample reflects the state of the entire global economy, rather than the structure of a given region. The composition of this sample has changed considerably over this period. As a result, our 1998 sample includes several new global corporations from emerging economies such as China, Korea, Mexico, Russia and Venezuela, as well as new firms from countries previously represented. The names of individual board members were obtained from a variety of sources, including Dun and Bradstreet, Moody's Directories, the Directory of Corporate Affiliations and the Directory of Multinationals.
Findings
Several findings stand out in our analyses. First, there has indeed been a significant increase in the number of global linkages among the boards of directors of the world's largest corporations over the past two decades. Second, the growth in international linkages has outpaced the expansion of domestic ties. Third, the geographical distribution and intensification of these ties do not reflect the global distribution of corporate head-quarters.
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A comparison of Carroll and Fennema's data from their 176 company sample and our global 500 sample highlights many differences, as presented in Table 1 . Carroll and Fennema report little change in the number of interlocks between 1976 and 1996: an overall total of 368 linkages and 84 transnational ties in 1976, and 355 total ties and 88 transnational links in 1996. In our larger sample, we find substantial growth in both areas between 1983 and 1996. There are 905 total ties in 1983, which increases to 1097 in 1998. We also find a corresponding growth in transnational linkages, from 120 in 1983 to 186 in 1998. The only area where Carroll and Fennema report greater numbers of interlocks is for the intraEuropean ties. They report nearly twice as many linkages within European firms in 1976 than we find in 1983 (51 to 27), and 58 ties in 1996, compared to the 88 links in our 1998 sample. This is not surprising, given the oversampling construction used by Carroll and Fennema. Clearly, our larger sample portrays very different global processes than those suggested by Carroll and Fennema's sample. There are two points, however, on which we agree. First, the largest growth in transnational linkages has been within the European Community. Second, Japanese firms are not part of this expanding global network.
Fortune Global 500
We turn now to a detailed analysis of our data. Several findings stand out. First, there has been a substantial increase in the number and proportion of transnational interlocks among Fortune Global 500 firms. Second, this growth has occurred primarily among European firms and between firms in Europe and the US. Third, East Asian firms (primarily Japan and South Korea) are noticeably absent from these global networks. Finally, there has been a significant increase in domestic interlocks within certain European countries.
We begin with comparisons of the total number of domestic and international corporate interlocks for the Fortune Global 500 in 1983 and 1998 by country, in terms of dichotomous linkages. We do not distinguish between thin and thick ties, although this distinction is a valuable one for certain questions. For purposes of these analyses, however, we are interested in the existence of linkages among these TNCs, rather than the strength of the ties that connect them. In other words, we are focusing on the extent of integration of these boards, rather than the power relationships among them.
The basic data are given in Table 2 . In 1983, 464 of the Fortune Global 500 shared at least one director, with a total of 875 interlocks among them. By 1998, this total had grown to 1097 linkages, a 25.4 percent increase. Domestic interlocks grew from 755 in 1983 to 916 in 1998, a 21.3 percent Carroll and Fennema (2002) Carroll and Fennema (2002: 408) . b Not reported by Carroll and Fennema (2002) . change over this period. International interlocks grew at a faster rate, from 120 in 1983 to 181 in 1998, more than a 50 percent growth rate. International interlocks accounted for 15.9 percent of all interlocks in 1983, increasing to nearly 20 percent in 1998. Further, 38 percent of the growth in total interlocks between 1983 and 1998 was in international interlocks. The overall ratio of domestic to international interlocks declined from 6.29:1 in 1983 to 5.06:1 in 1998, a 24 percent change. It is significant to note that this growing integration is not evenly distributed across countries, in terms of either the location of Fortune Global 500 firms or the interlocks between them. In 1983, these firms were located in 33 countries. Nearly 44 percent (219) of these were headquartered in the US. European firms (primarily in Germany, the UK and France) accounted for 33 percent, and Japanese corporations comprised 14 percent (71) of the total. Firms in 12 countries had domestic interlocks; the most integrated being the US, with 80 percent (603) of all domestic linkages. European firms accounted for 15 percent of all domestic interlocks, primarily in Germany (53) and the UK (41), while Japanese companies had only 16 domestic interlocks. Ten countries were linked internationally by boards of directors. US firms accounted for 39 percent (94) of all international interlocks, with nearly half of these ties being with Canadian firms.
The distribution of firms, and their interlocks, had shifted significantly by 1998. The Global 500 were now located in only 25 countries. Firms in 13 of these countries had domestic interlocks, while boards in 14 countries were linked internationally. US firms represented only 37 percent of the Global 500 in 1998, while Japanese firms increased to 20 percent, and the number of European companies remained nearly constant, with approximately 34 percent of the total. US corporations were still the most integrated domestically, accounting for 63 percent (580) of all domestic interlocks. European companies (primarily Germany, France, UK and Switzerland) had 267, or 29 percent, of all domestic linkages, while Japanese firms had only 45 (5 percent) domestic interlocks.
Perhaps the most accurate measure of change is the number of interlocks per corporation, which is given in Table 3 for selected countries. This is a standardized measure of interlocks that controls for the number of Fortune 500 firms located in a given country, and reflects the tendency of companies in a particular country to form interlocks with other Global 500 firms, both domestically and internationally. The changes across countries and over time are significant. In 1983, US firms had an average of 2.75 domestic interlocks and 0.43 international interlocks, for a total of 3.18 interlocks per firm. Only Canadian companies surpassed this rate, with 1.2 domestic interlocks per firm and 2.25 international interlocks per firm. The overall average for Europe was 0.85 total interlocks per firm. This varied widely, however, across countries. French companies, for example, had an average of 0.78 total interlocks per firm while German companies averaged 2.25 total interlocks per firm. Japanese firms were the least likely to form interlocks in 1983, with only 0.23 domestic interlocks and 0.01 international interlocks per company.
By 1998, these rates had changed significantly for some countries, while others remained stable. The average number of interlocks for US and Canadian firms changed little over this period, while firms in some European countries became substantially more integrated, both domestically and internationally. German firms had more than doubled the number of total interlocks, with 4.69 per firm, as had the Netherlands, with 4.22 interlocks per firm. Total interlocks by French firms grew nearly five-fold, to 3.74 interlocks per firm, as did Swiss firms, with 3.27 interlocks per company. East Asian firms remained outside this global network. Japanese firms continued to have the fewest total interlocks of the major economic powers, with only 0.50 interlocks per firm.
The changes in the number and distribution of transnational ties are presented in Figures 1 and 2 . Two points are most notable. First, the Fortune Global 500 firms are distributed over one-third fewer countries in 1998 than in 1983. Second, East Asian firms, particularly Japanese and South Korean, are not part of this global nexus in spite of the growing number of Global 500 firms located in these countries.
Conclusions
It is clear from the analysis of our data that the global corporate structure of the world economy has become substantially more integrated over the past 20 years. There has been a significant growth in the extent to which the world's largest firms are connected through their board of directors, 1998/1983 1998/1983 1998/1983 primarily within and between certain European countries and between European and American firms. The striking growth of European linkages was facilitated, at least in part, by policies pursued by the European Union after 1983. One of the explicit principal objectives of the EU was the establishment of an internal common market to support the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. As a major event, the EU published a White Paper on the completion of the internal market in 1985. This document identified the 279 legislative measures needed to remove obstacles to trade within the Community and put forward a schedule for the creation of the Single European Market by the close of 1992. The Single European Act was adopted in 1986 and came into force in July 1987 as the logical follow-up to the 1985 White Paper. Clearly, state and interstate policies can have a significant influence on corporate networks.
Also notable is the absence of transnational linkages with Japanese and Korean firms. Although there have been no systematic studies of this phenomenon, it is likely that cultural differences play a significant role.
Both countries put a lot of emphasis on the local way of doing things. Transnational interlocking directorates suggest foreign influences, which are generally resisted by these cultures. More to the point, board memberships are important to running keiretsus and chaebols, and are mostly insiders, so foreigners would be disruptive to the traditional model. Our overall findings are very different in some, though not all respects from those reported by Carroll and Fennema. We suggest that this is due to the different sampling designs employed in the respective analyses. Carroll and Fennema's disproportionate stratified sample of 176 firms charts the changes over time among a select group of firms from 1976 to 1996. This method of oversampling European firms does not reflect the realities of the global economy, in terms of either the early dominance of the US economy or the rise of the Japanese. Nor does it take into account new companies that emerge after 1976. A prime example of this is Asea Brown Boveri, a Swiss-Swedish company not included in their sample, which is a member of the Fortune Global 500 in 1998. This firm had the most transnational interlocks (13) of any Fortune Global 500 company. The failure to include such companies in the analyses has a significant impact on the results. This is not to suggest that Carroll and Fennema's work is without merit. Their detailed examination of a constant group of European firms gives us valuable insights into the shifting relationships within the European Community.
The implications of this global shift are significant. As the process of global integration among transnational corporations intensifies, these firms may become increasingly unified actors in the global economy, and the individuals who control these organizations may indeed emerge as a global capitalist class. Mergers and acquisitions may accelerate and intensify this process (Renner, 2000) . Moreover, these actors will be, to an ever greater extent, outside the control of the nation-states within which they are geographically located. Economic, political and social policies, historically regulated by nation-states, will increasingly be influenced and possibly dictated by these transnational organizations and those who control them.
Notes
1. See Fennema's (1982) Appendix for a description of the sample distribution. 2. It could be argued, in fact, that the Fortune 500 represents the entire population of significant transnational firms, rather than a sample.
